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are substantial differences in unemployment durations and reemployment outcomes
for workers coming from different occupations. I argue that this variation can
be explained in part by differences in occupational employment risk, arising from
two sources: (1) the diversification of occupational employment across industries;
and (2) the volatility of industry employment fluctuations, including sectoral co-
movements. I define and estimate a measure of occupational employment risk
(OER), which I relate to unemployment durations and wage losses. My results
indicate that unemployed workers in high employment risk occupations, as defined
by the OER measure, have 5 percent lower hazard ratios of leaving unemployment
to a job in the same occupation and have around 5 percent higher wage losses
upon reemployment than workers in low OER occupations. Among occupational
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than workers in lower OER occupations.
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by doing in the medical area, because of its important policy implications. How-
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Part I
How Hard Is It to Get Another Job? Occupational Employment Risk and its
Consequences for Unemployment Duration and Wages
1
1.1 Introduction
This paper documents substantial differences in unemployment durations and
re-employment outcomes across workers coming from different occupations. It ar-
gues that this variation comes in part from the fact that some occupations have a
more diversified portfolio of employment opportunities than others. For instance,
occupations employed by many industries in the economy, like ‘accountants’, have a
well diversified portfolio of employment options, while occupations employed only
by a handful of quite volatile industries, like ‘earth drillers’, have a much more
concentrated portfolio of employment choices.
Looking at the data, one can observe a large variation in average unemploy-
ment durations and wage losses across occupations (see table and figure 1.1).1 Fig-
ure 1.2 presents occupational differences in average wage change upon re-employment
for occupational stayers and occupational switchers.2 We can see from this figure
that wage loss variation is present regardless of whether workers switch occupations
or not upon re-employment.3 One of the striking features of these figures is that dif-
ferences in unemployment duration and wage losses are present even among closely
related occupations with seemingly similar level of skills, education, training, and
1These averages are reported for 45 ‘detailed occupational codes’, which is an intermediate
occupational classification (between two and three-digit codes) given by the Current Population
Survey (CPS).
2Occupational stayers are workers reemployed in the same occupation they held in their pre-
vious job, while occupational switchers are workers that change occupation upon re-employment.
3I also examined whether this observed variation on wage losses were due to an uneven distri-
bution of displaced workers across occupations - since they may suffer greater wage losses upon
re-employment than than non-displaced workers. However, I still find the same large variation,
whether or not they switched occupations upon re-employment. Displaced workers are workers
that report losing their jobs due to layoff or plant closing.
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work performed. For instance, there are large differences in duration and wage
outcomes between low skill blue-collar occupations, like ‘cleaning and building ser-
vices’ and ‘handlers and laborers,’ and between high skill white collar occupations
like ‘engineering and science technicians’ and ‘other technicians’. This suggests that
variation in workers characteristics alone, especially in educational attainment, can-
not explain why individuals in some occupations face longer unemployment spells
and greater wage losses than individuals in other closely related occupations.
Past studies of unemployment duration and wage determination have ac-
knowledged the relevance of an individual’s occupation either directly, by differ-
entiating workers between blue and white collar or main occupational groups, or
indirectly by controlling for occupation in their analysis. However, only recently
have studies tried to investigate why occupations are important to employment and
wages. For a long time, economists have considered firm-specific skills to play a
major role in earnings determination.4 Conflicting findings regarding the magni-
tude of tenure effects on earnings profile led Neal (1995) and later Parent (2000)
to examine whether industry-specific human capital is more important in explain-
ing earnings than firm-accumulated skills. Both studies find evidence in favor of
industry-specific skills.
Most recently, a growing line of work has been emphasized occupation rather
than industry as the level of human capital specificity that is relevant to earnings.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) and Poletaev and Robinson (2003 and 2004)
4See Abraham and Faber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991). For a complete
discussion of the literature see Willies (1986).
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show that the evidence for industry specific capital is weak and that the data is
consistent with a more general skill measure of human capital, like occupation.
They find that when occupation or a set of skills specific to occupations are taken
into account, industry and firm-specific human capital lose their importance in
explaining earnings. Their results suggest that occupation captures an important
component of human capital which is relevant to earnings determination.5 In light
of this new evidence, unemployed workers have an incentive to look for a job in the
occupation they held previously, so that they can retain and therefore capitalize on
their occupation-specific human capital.
Another aspect of human capital that has attracted attention in the recent
years is the labor income risk associated with different skills. It has become com-
mon in the literature to assume that individuals with different skills or levels of
accumulated human capital face different labor income risk.6 In this paper, how-
ever, I show that there is another aspect of human capital risk that has not been
studied before and that seems to have an important role in explaining observable
differences in unemployment duration and wage losses across occupations.
In particular, I analyze differences in the diversification of employment op-
portunities faced by each occupation. I argue that differences in this risk arise from
the large variation in the distribution of occupational employment across industries
5Occupations are, in general, classified based on an exclusive set of specific skills and skill
demands which uniquely define them. Among this set of specific skills are the nature of work
performed, education, training, and work credentials.
6Most studies measure human capital risk as differences in the variance of labor income as-
sociated with different levels of skills. See for example Grossmann (2005) and Huggett et al.
(2005).
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and from the fact that industries have different employment volatilities. The com-
bination of these two facts implies that some occupations have a more diversified
portfolio of employment opportunities than others. This suggests that the individ-
uals employed in more diversified occupations potentially face lower unemployment
risk than individuals employed in occupations with lower diversification, which
may translate into shorter unemployment spells and/or lower wages losses upon
re-employment. I call this phenomenon Occupational Employment Risk (OER).
Regarding the distribution of occupational employment, occupations can dif-
fer in both the number of different industries that employ them7 and in how concen-
trated across these industries their employment is. Looking at the data, one can see
that there is a quite large variation in the number of industries that employ different
occupations. For instance, in the 1990 Census data the occupation ‘accountants’
is employed by 157 out of 158 three-digit industries, while the occupation ‘earth
drillers’ is only employed by 13 of these industries (see figure 1.3).8
Second, occupations vary enormously in the concentration of their employ-
ment across industries. It is not uncommon to see occupations with more than 75%
of their employment concentrated in one or two industries, regardless of how many
industries employ the occupation. These differences in occupational employment
concentration across industries can be well summarized by a Herfindahl Index of
employment concentration.9 Table 1.2 presents the Herfindahl index for each occu-
7In a sense this captures how transferable occupational skills are across industries.
8Appendix A.2 provides details on occupational and industry codes.
9A Herfindahl index of employment concentration can be obtained for each occupation by sum-
ming, across all industries, the squared shares of the occupation’s employment in each industry.
This index is bounded between 0 and 1 and the higher is its value, the more concentrated across
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pation. Similar to unemployment duration and wage loss, there is large variation
in the concentration of occupational employment across industries. Some occupa-
tions, like ‘financial records’ or ‘handlers and laborers’, have very low Herfindahl
values and therefore low industry employment concentration, while occupations like
‘teachers’ and ‘construction laborers’ have their employment highly concentrated
in few industries. Figure 1.4 graphs the Herfindahl values for all occupations shown
in table 1.2. Even within major occupational groups, there is large variation in the
concentration of occupational employment.
Aside from differences in the distribution of occupational employment, vari-
ation in industries’ employment fluctuations are also important to occupational
employment opportunities and should be taken into account when studying oc-
cupational employment risk. Given the uneven distribution of occupational em-
ployment across industries, differences in industries’ employment fluctuations10 can
greatly affect the portfolio of employment opportunities faced by each occupation.
Returning to the case illustrated in figure 1.3, both ‘accountants’ and ‘earth drillers’
are employed by the construction industry, which is highly volatile. We can see from
the figure that more than 80% of ‘earth drillers’ are employed by the construction
sector and only few other industries employ them. Among those are ‘metal mining’,
‘non metal mining’ and ‘cement, concrete and plaster products’, all of which are
very volatile and exhibit strong temporal co-movement with construction. So if
industries the occupational employment is.
10Some industries face more frequent and/or larger shocks than others. For example, low
aggregate demand or high oil prices can affect some industries more heavily than others. Sectors
like construction, transportation and services, for instance, are usually more volatile than other
sectors.
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the construction sector is hit by an idiosyncratic shock and lays off many workers,
including ‘earth drillers’ and ‘accountants’, ‘earth drillers’ would probably have a
harder time finding a new job in the same occupation, since the construction indus-
try is their main employer, and the other industries that employ them are probably
comoving with construction (being affected by the same shock). Unemployed earth
drillers can change occupation in order to shorten their unemployment spell; how-
ever, we know from our previous discussion that if they do so they are likely to
have a higher wage loss, since they lose their occupation-specific human capital.
Accountants, however, can more easily leave the construction sector and look for
an accountant job in a different industry. In fact, only 5.2% of accountants are
employed in construction and they can work for any other industry in the economy,
some of which will not be comoving with construction.
In this paper, I combine the specific-human capital preservation motive with
employment risk variation to explain the differences in unemployment duration and
wage losses across occupations. In order to do so, I define a measure of occupational
employment risk (OER), which I estimate using data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages, years 1979-2000. I then relate this measure to unem-
ployment duration and wage loss using a constructed weekly panel of employment
and demographic histories for 5,579 males in the NLSY79, which includes employer
characteristics for up to five jobs each individual held during any year in the period
1979-2000. I find, as expected, that workers in high risk occupations, as defined
by the OER measure, have lower hazard ratios of leaving unemployment to a job
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in the same occupation and have higher wage losses than workers in low risk OER
occupations, especially if they switch occupations.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1.2 discusses the methodology
used in order to measure occupation employment risk. Section 1.3 estimates the
effect of OER on unemployment duration, while Section 1.4 relates this risk measure
to wage losses. Section 1.5 presents conclusions and suggestions for future work.
1.2 Measuring Occupational Employment Risk (OER)
In this section, I define and construct a measure that depends on the diversi-
fication of occupational employment across industries and on the level of industry
employment volatility, including co-movements. In a sense, the employment oppor-
tunities of an occupation can be seen as a portfolio of industries where the weights
are the shares of occupational employment in each industry and the rates of re-
turn are the industry volatilities. To my knowledge, this study is the first to define
and calculate a measure of employment risk associated with particular occupations,
although a number of studies in the literature have estimated either the risk asso-
ciated with aggregate employment volatility or different industries’ unemployment
risk. Neumann and Topel (1991) measure unemployment risk for workers in a par-
ticular locality as the variance of the within-market local demand uncertainty, e′V ,
where e is the vector of local industry employment shares and V the vector of es-
timated sectoral local employment shocks. Based on the assumption that workers
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are mobile within local markets11, they show that the sectoral composition of the
market forms an implicit “portfolio of employment opportunities in which less spe-
cialized markets may achieve lower unemployment.” The authors find that their
measure explains differences in unemployment rates among geographically distinct
labor markets.12 Through the use of a similar measure, Shea (2002) finds that in-
terindustry co-movement is responsible for 95% of the variance of manufacturing
employment.13 Using 126 three-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period
1959-1986, he estimates aggregate employment risk by decomposing annual employ-
ment growth into an average of industry growth rates, weighted by the industries’
share of employment.
My idea builds upon the fact that occupational employment is distributed
unevenly across industries. Some occupations are employed in many industries,
while others are only employed in a small number of industries. Meanwhile, different
industries have different cyclicalities. In this context, it is reasonable to expect
that different occupations may have diverse levels of employment risk associated
with them. Occupations used in a larger number of industries may potentially
face a lower employment risk given that they have more diversified employment
opportunities. In order to examine whether this is really the case, I construct a
measure of occupational employment risk (OER) which considers two important
11Their argument is based on the assumption that if there are many goods and if skills are
transferable, workers are mobile within local markets.
12In addition, they show that within-market changes in demand uncertainty had positive, but
only minor effects on within-market changes in unemployment.
13Shea estimates that the average pairwise correlation of annual employment growth is 0.34
and that, even after aggregating industries to 20 two-digit industries codes, co-movement is still
responsible for over 86% of manufacturing employment variation. For more on co-movements, see
Long and Plosser (1983) and Horvath (1998).
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dimensions of risk: the concentration of occupational employment across industries
and the volatility and co-movement of disaggregated industry employment. The
OER measure is calculated in a fashion similar to Neumann/Topel and Shea.
The concentration component of the OER measure is obtained by calculat-
ing the shares of occupational employment in each industry. Svj is the share of





where empvj is the employment of occupation v in industry j and empv is the total
employment in occupation v. I assume the shares to be in steady-state and compute
them from the 1990 Census Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) by constructing
an occupation-by-industry employment matrix. I must make a steady-state as-
sumption due to the lack of annual data on occupational employment by industry
for the time period I consider. The limitation of making such an assumption is
that if the occupational employment shares are changing over time, my measure of
OER would not capture these trends.14 However, this issue is minimized by the fact
that most of the trends in shares occur at the three-digit occupational classification
level, while I use a more aggregated occupational classification, which makes the
shares more robust to changes over time. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I
also estimated a version of OER using 1980 Census shares and I obtained similar
results.15 I use 1990 shares since 1990 is the midpoint of my analysis.
14Note that the steady-state assumption of the shares of occupational employment in each
industry is not necessarily inconsistent with the well-known phenomenon of skill upgrading within
industries, as long as all industries are shedding less-skilled workers at the same rate.
15The overall correlation of the shares of occupational employment in each industry between
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The volatility component, Ωε, is constructed using the variance-covariance
matrix of disaggregated industry employment growth rates, εjt, j = 1, ...J and
t = 1978, ...2000, which I estimate using data from the Quarterly Census of Em-
ployment and Wages (QCEW) over the period 1978 to 2000.16 In particular, note
that Ωε incorporates not only the variance of industry employment but also the co-
movements among industries.17 The QCEW contains information on the number of
establishments, employment, and total wages of employees covered by various un-
employment insurance programs. A nice feature of this data set is that it provides
industry employment data for every four-digit industry at national, state, MSA
and county levels for the period 1975-2004.18 The main limitation, however, is the
change in industry codes over the time period available (years 1975-1987 use the
1972 SIC, 1988-2000 use the 1987 SIC and 1990-2004 use the NAICS). I deal with
this issue by matching industry codes between the first two time periods in order
to make the industry classification consistent through 1978-2000. The criterion I
used was to merge 3-digit industry codes if one or more of their 4-digit industries
are reported to be combined. Details about the industry code matching may be
found in the appendix at the end of the paper.19
1980 and 1990 is 0.98. Calculating this correlation separately for each occupation, I find the
lowest correlation to be quite high (0.79 for ‘Personal Services Occupations’).
16Specifically, εjt=∆log(empjt).
17I have tried different specifications for estimating Ωε. In particular, using industry employ-
ment shocks estimated by controlling for industry specific characteristics with and without year
dummies, I obtain similar results, regardless of the specification I use, so I opted for the simplest
specification.
18Data for certain establishments under government ownership are not disclosed, so the total
employment in these industries will be somewhat underestimated.
19For an extensive discussion of the criteria applied and the constructed crosswalk, see Tristao
(2005).
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I next assume that the growth rate of employment for a particular occupation
can be (first-order) approximated as a weighted average of industry employment






(Svj ∗ εjt), v = 1, ..., V ; j = 1, ..., J. (1.2)
where J is the number of industries, V is the number of occupations and OEGvt
is a first-order approximation of the growth rate of employment in occupation v at
time t.
My benchmark measure of occupational risk is calculated as the implied vari-
ance of the (unobserved) growth rate of occupational employment:
OERv = V ar(OEGvt) = SvjΩεS
′
vj . (1.3)
where Svj is a 1 × J vector of occupation v
′s industry shares and Ωε is a J × J
matrix of variances and covariances of j′s employment growth rates. It is worth
noting that this measure has a lower bound at zero but is unbounded from above.
The OER measure is estimated for 158 3-digit industry codes and 46 ‘detailed’
occupational codes,21 which is an intermediate occupational classification (between
two and three-digit occupational codes) given by the Current Population Survey
20This assumption, however, would not be robust to deskilling, even if deskilling was uniform
across industries. This happens because by calculating the product of these shares with the corre-
spondent industry employment growth - which implies the occupational employment, is growing
at the industry employment growth rate - we may overestimate the occupational employment
growth of occupations that are disappearing. For instance, suppose 50% of the occupation ‘typ-
ist’ is employed in industry A and the other 50% is employed in industry B, and that although the
employment in both industries are growing by 10%, they are both laying-off 50% of their ‘typists’.
According to equation (2), ‘typists’ employment would grow by 10%, while in fact, it decreased
by 50%.
21See appendix A.2 for a description.
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(CPS). There are two main advantages to using this classification. The first is that
workers may consider their skills to fit more than one three-digit occupation, which
could lead them to search for a job in closely related occupation. For example,
a worker whose three-digit occupation is a ‘Payroll and Timekeeping Clerk’ may
also see himself as a ‘Billing Clerk’ 22 and consider jobs in both positions. Second,
a more aggregate classification reduces the problem of measurement errors from
occupational misclassifications, which is an issue in other longitudinal studies using
occupations.23 Nevertheless, the detailed occupational code (from now on referred
as DOC), is still quite a rich classification, with three times as many occupational
categories as the two-digit code.
Figure 1.5 presents the OER measure for different occupations. One can see
that there is a large variation in this measure of employment risk across occupations,
even within closely related occupational groups. In the next two sections, I relate
this measure to unemployment duration and wage loss in order to examine whether
workers in higher employment risk occupations indeed face longer unemployment
spells and wage losses than workers in lower employment risk occupations.24
1.3 OER Measure and Unemployment Duration
In this section, I estimate the effect of OER on the hazard rate of leaving
unemployment and, consequently, on the length of unemployment spells. In light
22These two occupations are classified as being closely related by the Occupational Outlook
Handbook published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
23See Kambourov and Manovskii (2002 and 2005) and Neal (1995) for discussions.
24The correlation between the OER measure and the average unemployment duration and wage
loss is is 0.18 and -0.17, respectively.
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of recent evidence showing the relevance of occupation-specific human capital to
earnings, unemployed workers have an incentive to look for a job in the occupation
they held previously, so they can retain and therefore capitalize on their occupation-
specific human capital. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between
two exit modes out of unemployment: finding a job in the same or in a different
occupation. In order to accomplish this, I use a continuous-time competing risk
model, which I estimate by using a Cox Proportional Hazard model with multiple
spells and time-varying covariates.
The main reason for choosing this specific regression model is that it allows
me to estimate the relationship between the hazard rate and explanatory variables
without imposing any parametric assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard
function, h0(t).25 Not having to parameterize h0(t) is desirable in this context
because it eliminates the need to make assumptions on how the hazard changes
over time. Incorrect assumptions on the shape of h0(t) would produce incorrect
results regarding how the covariates affect the hazard. The only assumption made
concerning the shape of h0(t) is that it is the same for everyone.26 The Cox model
is often called semiparametric because the effect of the covariates is parameterized
and is assumed to shift the baseline hazard function multiplicatively. The hazard
25Cox (1972) proposed a method for estimating the covariates without having to make any
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard function, which in fact is not even estimated.
This method relies on the assumption of proportional hazard and is estimated by partial likelihood
rather than maximum likelihood.
26See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for a rigorous treatment and Cleves et al. (2004) for an
intuitive discussion.
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rate for the ith subject in the data is:
h(t/xi(t)) = h0(t)e
(xi(t)βx) (1.4)
The baseline hazard can be estimated separately, conditional on the estimates of
βx. I specify the relative hazard to be:
e(xi(t)βx) = exp(β1OERv + βxXi(t) + βzZi(t)) (1.5)
where OERv is the occupational employment risk measure for occupation v. Xit
is a vector of demographic characteristics which include age, measures of ability,
a dummy for race, marital status and educational attainment. The measures of
ability are the first two principal components of the age-adjusted Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores, obtained by following the two-step
methodology presented by Cawley et al. (1995) and Kermit et al. (1997). The
appendix at the end of the paper provides details.27 Zi(t) is a vector containing
relevant work history information, including years of work experience and tenure in
the previous job, a dummy for receiving unemployment compensation during the
unemployment spell, and the local unemployment rate.28
Construction of the Panel
I restrict the sample to unemployment spells whose duration was less than 53
weeks in occupations for which there were at least 20 observations. I make these
restrictions to obtain more reliable estimates, by reducing classical measurement
27The ASVAB is a set of ten tests measuring knowledge and skill in different areas.
28In order to capture nonlinear effects, I also include quadratic terms for age, ability, experience
and tenure.
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error in the data and by not including possibly discouraged workers.29 In order to
exclude the period of high job turnover at the beginning of individuals’ careers, I
further restrict the sample by considering only spells in which the individual was
at least 21 years old at the beginning of the spell (see Neal (1995)). Moreover, I
consider only completed spells, which I define to be a transition from employment
to unemployment and then back to employment again, except for the last spell in
the sample, which may be censored.30 The duration of a spell is the difference in
weeks between the end and the beginning of the spell.
The data set I use to assess the relevance of the OER measure for unem-
ployment duration and wages is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men
and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. De-
tailed information on these individuals’ demographic characteristics and labor force
participation has been collected since 1979.31 This paper uses the unbalanced panel
of civilian males, covering 1979-2000, which contains 5,579 individuals. I restrict
the sample to males in order to avoid labor force participation issues that arise
when including women in the sample.
Relative to other micro data sets, the NLSY79 has two distinct features that
makes it the best data to answer my particular question. First, the NLSY79 work
29Out of the 45 detailed occupational codes, there were 16 codes for which there were less than
ten observations, representing 1.4% of the spells. Unemployment spells with a duration of more
than 52 weeks were less than 2% of the sample.
30A worker is considered to be unemployed by the NLSY if he or she did not work at all during
the survey week and is currently searching or has searched for a job in the four weeks prior to the
survey.
31Data was collected annually from 1979 to 1993, and biennially from 1994 to the present.
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history data is available on a weekly basis. Since a significant number of unemploy-
ment spells are very short, this high frequency is quite important.
Second, and most importantly, the NLSY79 is one of few data sets that pro-
vides a complete work history for a specific cohort, which allows researchers to ana-
lyze completed unemployment spells.32 This is one of the most desirable attributes
of a data set for studying labor force transitions and unemployment duration, and
it constitutes a significant advantage of the NLSY79 over the Current Population
Survey (CPS) data, where unemployment spells are incomplete and cohorts change
over time. Most studies analyzing unemployment duration in the U.S. use CPS
data on spells in progress. Based on the steady-state assumption that flows in
and out of unemployment are constant over time, existing studies either estimate
the expected length of spell duration for a synthetic cohort of individuals entering
unemployment (using continuation rates) or estimate the average completed spell
length for the currently unemployed workers by ‘doubling’ the average duration of
their spells.33 However, when steady-state conditions do not hold, both estimators
can be biased. Rising unemployment will cause the steady-state method to under-
estimate completed spell lengths, while decreasing unemployment will cause this
method to overestimate the length of spells.34 In addition to the advantages men-
32It is possible for the NLSY to construct a complete work history for each respondent, regardless
of period of non-interview, because its survey questions are designed to recover the starting and
ending dates for each labor force status change since the date of the last interview. See Appendix
A.1. for details.
33For some of the most recent and influential papers using the CPS data see Darby et al. (1997),
Baker (1992), Shimer and Abraham (2002) and Shimer (2005). Some exceptions are Dynarski
and Sheffrin (1986) and (1990) using the PSID.
34For studies discussing the technical difficulties in measuring completed spells see Sider (1985)
and Kiefer et al. (1985).
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tioned above, the NLSY79 also has ability measures and has lower attrition rates
than other longitudinal data sets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The downside of using the NLSY79 instead of the CPS is that I am able
to analyze only individuals of a specific cohort, which is still relatively young. In
2000, the individuals’ age range was 35 to 43 years old.
The NLSY79 collects detailed information on new and previously reported
employers for whom a respondent has worked since the date of last interview. For
every survey year, it reports up to five employers.35 Using start and end dates of
employment, as well as the job number assigned to each employer in every survey
round (which can vary across rounds), I linked all employers across survey years and
further to the weekly work history files.36 This allowed me to merge employer and
job characteristics, such as industry and occupational codes, with the work history
file. I also merge employees’ main demographic characteristics, creating a weekly
panel of employment and demographic histories for up to five jobs each individual
held during any year in the period 1979-2000. This panel allows me to obtain good
measures of work experience and tenure within given employer, which I calculate
weekly by accumulating the number of weeks reported working and working for a
particular employer, respectively.
Issues that normally arise with the use of occupational codes (and to a less ex-
35In fact, the NLSY79 collects information for all employers for whom a respondent has worked
since the date of last interview. According to the NLSY documentation files, however, the number
of respondents who report more than five jobs in each survey is less than one percent of those
interviewed.
36Since employers can receive different job numbers across years, it is necessary to use beginning
and ending dates as well as a series of other supporting variables which jointly taken indicate, for
every current survey employer the job number it received in the previous survey and whether it
is a new job.
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tent, industry codes) are (i) individuals doing the same job can be coded as having
different occupations and (ii) the same individual working in the same occupation
can be coded differently across survey rounds, generating spurious occupation mo-
bility. As I mentioned in the last section, in order to minimize measurement errors
from misclassifications of occupational descriptions, I use a more aggregated occu-
pational classification, which combines closely related occupations, but which still
contains three times as many occupational categories as the two-digit code. Taking
advantage of my panel of individual work histories within each employer, I eliminate
the second type of problem by defining the occupation in each job to be the mode
of occupational codes ever reported for that employer, instead of the code reported
in every survey round for that job. This is a significant improvement over previous
studies that have used reported occupation codes in the NLSY79,37 provided that
one accepts the assumption that there is no genuine occupational change for indi-
viduals working for a given employer. A similar procedure was applied to industry
codes.38
Table 1.3 shows the basic characteristics of the sample. The last two columns
present the same statistics conditional on remaining in the same occupation and
switching occupation upon reemployment, respectively.39 One can see from this
37Neal (1999) assumes each employer’s industry and occupational codes to be the first one ever
reported.
38For the NLSY79 civilian-male sample, I estimate a significant amount of within-employer 3-
digit occupation and industry miscoding over time. In fact, more than 88.9% of within employer 3-
digit occupational code changes and more than 88.4% of within-employer 3-digit industry changes
are spurious, transitory changes. Genuine within-employer changes represent, respectively, only
6.66% and 7.92% of true occupational and industry mobility at the 3-digit level.
39The omitted category are spells for which no occupational code was reported either for the
previous job or the new job, or both.
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table that around 44% of completed unemployment spells end in occupational mo-
bility and that workers who switch occupations seem to be different from workers
who remained in the same occupation. In comparison to workers who switch, a
larger fraction of stayers are white, single, have a college degree, have more expe-
rience and tenure, and report having used unemployment insurance. In addition,
more occupational switchers report having been displaced than occupational stay-
ers.40
Results
Table 1.4 shows the estimated hazard ratios of the competing risk model,
obtained by estimating a Cox PH model. The coefficients can be read as the
ratio of the hazards of leaving unemployment implied by a one-unit change in the
corresponding covariate. The proportionate change is obtained by subtracting one
from the estimated hazard ratios provided in the table 1.4.41 One can see that,
indeed, the measure of occupation employment risk seems to affect the hazard of
leaving unemployment. In particular, a one-unit increase in the OER measure
reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment to a job in the same occupation by
more than 25%. Translating, a one standard deviation increase in OER represents
a 5.1% decrease in the hazard of finding a job in every week of unemployment. All
else equal, a worker in a high OER occupation faces a longer unemployment spell
than a worker in a low OER occupation. The OER measure has no effect on the
40Displaced workers are workers that report losing their jobs due to layoff or plant closing.
41Notice that the benchmark coefficient is one rather than zero since the hazard rate is the
exponentiated coefficient.
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hazard of leaving unemployment to a job in a different occupation, however.
Turning to other covariates, I find that being white increases the hazard of
leaving unemployment to a job in the same occupation by 42%, but has no effect
on leaving unemployment to a job in a different occupation. In comparison with
high school dropouts, workers with a college degree have a 56.7% lower hazard rate
of getting a job in the same occupation and a 6.5% lower hazard getting a job in
a different occupation, although the latter result is not statistically significant. An
extra year of experience and tenure increases the hazard of leaving unemployment
to a job in the same occupation by 13.4% and 23.5%, respectively. An additional
year of experience increase the hazard of getting a job in a different occupation
by 6.3%, while an additional year of tenure reduces it by 16.8%. Having received
unemployment insurance increases by 24.1% the hazard of leaving unemployment
to a job in the same occupation, while it decreases by 28.4% the hazard of getting
a job in a different occupation. A one percentage point increase in the local unem-
ployment rate seems to have no effect on finding a job in the same occupation but
reduces by 2.7% the hazard of finding a job in a different occupation.
1.4 OER Measure and Wage Change
In order to assess whether OER has any effect on earnings losses when control-
ling for other covariates, I examine its impact on the change in log wage between
post- and pre-unemployment jobs. In particular, I estimate an Ordinary Least
Squares regression, where unemployment spells are the unit of observation. Since
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the sample includes multiple spells per individual, I use clustered standard errors
to account for the additional correlation. I estimate the following equation:
∆lnw = β0 + β1OER + β2X + β3Z + β4slength + ǫ (1.6)
X and Z are the same matrices of covariates used to estimate the effects of OER
on the hazard rate of leaving unemployment. All these covariates refer to pre-
unemployment values. slength is the total weeks of unemployment, which I expect
to have a negative estimated coefficient, given that workers tend to lower their
reservation wage as their unemployment spell length increases. In this context,
when explicitly accounting for slength in the regression, it’s coefficient measures
the effect of OER on wage changes through increases in unemployment duration
and lower reservation wages while the OER coefficient measures its direct effect on
wage gain or loss upon reemployment. In order to assess the total effect of OER
on wage, I also run the regressions without spell length.
I examined the effect of OER on earnings losses for three different samples:
occupation stayers, occupational switchers and the full sample. I expect it to in-
crease wage losses, especially for occupational switchers. The results are shown in
table 1.5. In fact, we can see that an increase in the OER measure increases the
wage loss for all three samples. This effect is statistically significant for occupa-
tional switchers (with and without spell length) and for the full sample (only with
spell length). In particular, a one-unit increase in the OER measure increases the
hourly wage loss by 4.88% for all workers and 11.5% for occupational switchers. For
a one standard deviation increase in OER, the corresponding numbers are 1% and
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2.3%, respectively. In addition, longer unemployment spells translate into higher
wage losses, with each extra week of unemployment increasing the hourly wage loss
by 0.1% for the full sample and by 0.2% for occupational stayers.42 Similarly, an
extra year of tenure increases wage loss by 2.1% for the full sample and by 6.2%
for occupational switchers.
These results, combined with those for unemployment duration, suggest that
workers in high risk occupations, as defined by the OER measure, have an incentive
to remain in the same occupation in order to avoid incurring higher wage losses,
even if this means facing longer unemployment spells.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper shows an aspect of human capital risk which has not been exam-
ined before and which seems to have an important role in explaining observable
differences in unemployment duration and wage losses across occupations. I argue
that this risk arises from the large differences in the distribution of occupational
employment across industries and from the fact that industries have different em-
ployment volatilities. These two facts imply that some occupations have a more
diversified portfolio of employment opportunities, suggesting that the individuals
employed in these occupations potentially face lower unemployment risk than indi-
viduals employed in occupations with less diversification.
42So high OER occupations face 4.88% of wage loss plus 0.1% for every extra week of unemploy-
ment they have, while workers in high OER occupations that switched occupations had 11.5% of
wage lost of plus 0.2% for every extra week of unemployment.
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Using data from the decennial Census and the Quarterly Census of Employ-
ment and Wages, I estimate a measure of Occupational Employment Risk (OER).
I find a large variation in this risk across occupations. I then relate the OER mea-
sure to occupational unemployment durations and wage losses upon reemployment,
using data from the NLSY79. Applying a competing risk duration model, I find
that workers in high risk occupations, as defined by the OER measure, have lower
hazard ratios of leaving unemployment to a job in the same occupation and have
higher wage losses than workers in low OER occupations, especially if they switch
occupations.
A next step in this research would be to investigate whether workers receive
compensating wage differentials for this type of risk and how this risk affects their
employment duration and incidence of unemployment. Preliminary exploration of
this issue indicates that workers in high OER measure occupations receive wage
compensating differentials and have longer employment spells than workers on low
OER occupations. In particular, it would be interesting to estimate a multiple state
transition model with three possible labor market states - employment, unemploy-
ment and out-of-the labor force - and examine the effects of the OER measure on the
probabilities of exiting and entering these states. As in Martinez-Granado (2002),
we could allow for unobservable individual heterogeneity, duration dependence,
lagged duration dependence and state dependence. Another possibility would be
to write a Mortensen-Pissarides model with the OER measure, which would suggest
that high OER jobs should be more durable and have more flexible wages than low
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OER jobs.
The type of risk documented and analyzed in this paper may affect the occu-
pational and career choice of individuals, the search strategy of unemployed work-
ers, and individual decisions about consumption and precautionary savings. With
respect to career choice, we could ask if individuals take into account the risk as-
sociated with specific occupations when they make career choice decisions. With
respect to search strategy of unemployed individuals, it is worth noting that OER
is closely related to the trade off between accepting a job today or waiting for a
better offer tomorrow. As shown in the paper, the risk associated with specific
occupations affects, on one hand, the wage that individuals receive upon reemploy-
ment, and on the other hand, the time they have to wait to receive an offer. It
follows, then, that occupational employment risk may imply different outcomes in
the optimal search of unemployed individuals.
Finally, it would be interesting to study whether OER risk affects precaution-
ary savings. This should have implications for wealth holdings and consumption
behavior. In the context of a life cycle model, the type of risk implied by occupa-
tional employment diversification would affect the transition matrix between being
employed/unemployed, which would affect optimal asset holdings. The relevant
question would be to quantify this effect either with a realistic life cycle model or
with some other empirical strategy.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1: Average Unemployment Duration and Wage Change by Occupation.
(CPS) Detailed Occupation Title Duration Std. Err. Wage Change Std. Err.
Executive, Administrators, and Managers, exc. Pub. Adm. 10.04 (0.78) -0.06 (0.04)
Management Related Occupations 12.79 (1.93) -0.06 (0.06)
Engineers 9.16 (1.67) -0.16 (0.11)
Teachers, Except College and University 5.73 (1.15) -0.07 (0.07)
Other Professional Specialty Occupations 9.15 (0.96) 0.11 (0.07)
Engineering and Science Technicians 10.77 (1.47) -0.05 (0.07)
Technicians, Except Health Engineering, and Science 6.94 (1.50) 0.14 (0.06)
Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 11.35 (2.12) -0.02 (0.05)
Sales Representatives, Commodities, Except Retail 10.83 (1.16) -0.17 (0.05)
Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 12.22 (1.90) 0.03 (0.07)
Financial Records, Processing Occupations 6.44 (1.47) 0.01 (0.04)
Mail and Message Distributing 10.42 (1.92) 0.04 (0.02)
Other Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 9.10 (0.79) 0.01 (0.04)
Protective Service Occupations 11.95 (1.81) -0.07 (0.05)
Food Service Occupations 10.57 (0.80) 0.01 (0.03)
Health Service Occupations 11.23 (2.08) 0.00 (0.03)
Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 13.31 (1.43) 0.05 (0.04)
Personal Service Occupations 10.55 (3.34) -0.06 (0.07)
Mechanics and Repairers 10.31 (0.78) 0.00 (0.03)
Construction Trades 9.61 (0.58) 0.01 (0.02)
Other Precision Production Occupations 11.01 (0.89) -0.01 (0.03)
Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 9.41 (0.71) -0.02 (0.02)
Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 9.18 (0.70) 0.02 (0.02)
Motor Vehicle Operators 10.02 (0.84) 0.01 (0.04)
Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 11.12 (1.16) -0.02 (0.02)
Construction Laborer 9.72 (0.57) 0.01 (0.03)
Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 11.01 (0.97) -0.02 (0.04)
Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 11.62 (0.87) 0.02 (0.04)
Farm Workers and Related Occupations 12.22 (0.79) 0.03 (0.04)
Forestry and Fishing Occupations 6.49 (1.24) 0.15 (0.10)
Overall 10.14 (1.82) -0.01 (0.02)
Number of obs. 6246 3619
Number of clusters 2216 1778
F-Test* 2.08 189.22
Prob > F 0.0007 0.0000
*F-test for equality of duration and wage loss across occupations. Across industries, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
equality.
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Table 1.2: Measure of occupational employment concentration.
(CPS) Detailed Occupation Title Herfindahl Index
Public Administration 0.162
Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 0.035
Management Related Occupations 0.046
Engineers 0.103
Mathematical and Computer Scientists 0.065
Natural Scientists 0.076
Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.461
Health Assessment and Treating Occupations 0.421
Teachers, College and University 0.951
Teachers, Except College and University 0.720
Lawyers and Judges 0.580
Other Professional Specialty Occupations 0.054
Health Technologists and Technicians 0.346
Engineering and Science Technicians 0.073
Technicians, Exc. Health, Engineering, and Science 0.045
Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 0.065
Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 0.348
Sales Representatives, Commodities, Exc Retail 0.089
Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 0.083
Sales Related Occupations 0.125
Supervisors - Administrative Support 0.042
Computer Equipment Operators 0.034
Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 0.038
Financial Records, Processing Occupations 0.027
Mail and Message Distributing 0.454
Other Adm. Support Occupations, Incl. Clerical 0.035
Private Household Service Occupations 1.000
Protective Service Occupations 0.343
Food Service Occupations 0.505
Health Service Occupations 0.257
Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 0.079
Personal Service Occupations 0.190
Mechanics and Repairers 0.054
Construction Trades 0.551
Other Precision Production Occupations 0.105
Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 0.067
Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 0.115
Motor Vehicle Operators 0.106
Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 0.090
Construction Laborer 0.833
Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 0.157
Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 0.028
Farm Operators and Managers 0.474
Farm Workers and Related Occupations 0.205
Forestry and Fishing Occupations 0.309
27
Table 1.3: Sample Statistics.
Variables All sample Stayers Switchers
Age 28.07 27.52 26.61
(0.11) (0.24) (0.17)
White 79.81% 84.27% 76.53%
Married 44.92% 40.52% 51.94%
Years Schooling 12.13 11.82 12.00
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
HS 70.52% 72.56% 68.91%
College 8.03% 3.92% 7.07%
Experience 4.98 4.65 3.79
(0.10) (0.21) (0.14)
Tenure 1.34 1.63 0.87
(0.07) (0.18) (0.05)
Received UI 41.77% 56.08% 34.36%
Displaced 19.99% 14.13% 24.28%
Number of spells 5344 1460 1143
N. of clusters 2216 743 738
Note: (1) Standard deviations are in parentheses; (2) 2,741 unemployment
spells (out of 5344) did not report occupational code either for the previous
or the new job or both.
Table 1.4: Unemployment Duration: Cox PH Estimated Hazards.
Same Occupation Different Occupation
coef. std coef. std
OER 0.746 (0.125)†* 0.997 (0.196)
White 1.423 (0.131)** 0.998 (0.087)
Age 0.788 (0.148) 1.102 (0.245)
Age2 1.004 (0.003) 0.997 (0.004)
Ability Factor 1 1.028 (0.021) 1.013 (0.018)
Ability Factor 12 0.996 (0.006) 0.998 (0.005)
Ability Factor 2 0.996 (0.006) 0.935 (0.043)
Ability Factor 22 1.016 (0.030) 0.977 (0.032)
High school 1.034 (0.099) 1.010 (0.091)
College 0.433 (0.127)** 0.914 (0.162)
Married 0.923 (0.072) 1.032 (0.084)
Experience 1.134 (0.070)* 1.063 (0.076)
Experience2 0.993 (0.004)† 0.999 (0.006)
Tenure 1.235 (0.064)** 0.832 (0.063)*
Tenure2 0.989 (0.005)* 1.013 (0.011)
Unemp. Ins. 1.241 (0.095)** 0.716 (0.058)**
Unemp. Rate 0.999 (0.016) 0.973 (0.013)*
Weeks of unemployment 11019 11019
N. of clusters 2035 2035
Wald chi2(17) 118.51 47.28
**, *, †: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; †* Significant at 8%.
Note: (1) Standard deviations are in parentheses; (2) Ability factors 1 and 2 are
the first two principal components of the age-adjusted ASVAB scores.
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Table 1.5: Wage Change: OLS estimates.
All sample Stayers Switchers
OER -0.04882 -0.05233 -0.00505 -0.01145 -0.11451 -0.11500
(0.03513)† (0.03491) (0.05019) (0.04958) (0.05414)* (0.05418)*
White -0.01447 -0.01193 -0.01319 -0.01060 -0.02328 -0.02284
(0.01511) (0.01499) (0.01561) (0.01548) (0.03587) (0.03582)
Age -0.01539 -0.01191 -0.01328 -0.01076 -0.02471 -0.01864
(0.02843) (0.02866) (0.02760) (0.02788) (0.06519) (0.06515)
Age2 0.00028 0.00021 0.00023 0.00017 0.00043 0.00032
(0.00049) (0.00050) (0.00048) (0.00049) (0.00111) (0.00111)
Ability Factor 1 0.00326 0.00366 0.00375 0.00430 0.00285 0.00324
(0.00372) (0.00374) (0.00375) (0.00379) (0.00867) (0.00864)
Ability Factor 12 0.00045 0.00040 -0.00026 -0.00019 0.00246 0.00225
(0.00111) (0.00112) (0.00121) (0.00122) (0.00241) (0.00239)
Ability Factor 2 0.01511 0.01460 0.01772 0.01772 0.01340 0.01232
(0.00743)* (0.00743)* (0.00785)* (0.00785)* (0.01536) (0.01528)
Ability Factor 22 0.00505 0.00498 0.00747 0.00796 0.00343 0.00280
(0.00464) (0.00466) (0.00489) (0.00497) (0.00980) (0.00978)
High School 0.00703 0.01231 -0.00436 0.00059 0.03728 0.04314
(0.01822) (0.01836) (0.01637) (0.01666) (0.04525) (0.04479)
College -0.03445 -0.02905 -0.00214 0.00294 -0.05741 -0.04974
(0.03952) (0.03974) (0.04666) (0.04681) (0.06894) (0.06871)
Married 0.01805 0.01603 -0.00446 -0.00666 0.06441 0.06326
(0.01513) (0.01521) (0.01557) (0.01574) (0.03295)† (0.03306)†
Experience 0.00326 0.00350 -0.00211 -0.00201 0.02008 0.02044
(0.01003) (0.01004) (0.00881) (0.00883) (0.02277) (0.02271)
Experience2 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00002
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Tenure -0.02110 -0.02126 -0.01123 -0.01140 -0.06172 -0.06297
(0.00829)* (0.00836)* (0.00752) (0.00759) (0.02680)* (0.02693)*
Tenure2 0.00004 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002 0.00011 0.00011
(0.00002)* (0.00002)* (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00006)† (0.00006)†
Spell length -0.00137 -0.00175 -0.00094
(0.00047)** (0.00060)** (0.00076)
Constant 0.23556 0.17132 0.24317 0.19142 0.29421 0.19481
(0.39435) (0.39557) (0.37861) (0.38099) (0.91489) (0.91009)
Number of spells 3462 3462 2212 2212 1250 1250
Number of clusters 1691 1691 1246 1246 884 884
F-Test 1.78 1.35 1.30 0.97 1.71 1.61
Prob > F 0.0290 0.1619 0.1864 0.4836 0.0390 0.0660
R-squared 0.0112 0.0127 0.0248 0.0071 0.0070 0.0227
**, *, †: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.





Figure 1.1: Average unemployment duration by occupation
*Occupations with less than twenty observations are omitted from the analysis.
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Source: NLSY79, 1979-2000.
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Figure 1.2: Average wage change by occupation
*Occupations with less than twenty observations are omitted from the analysis.
Average Wage Change by Occupation, Occ. Stayers
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2. Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 3. Management Related Occupations
4. Engineers 10. Teachers, Except College and University
12. Other Professional Specialty Occupations 14. Engineering and Science Technicians
15. Technicians, Exc. Health, Engineering, and Science 17. Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Servs.
18. Sales Representatives, Commodities, Exc Retail 19. Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services
24. Financial Records, Processing Occupations 25. Mail and Message Distributing
26. Other Adm. Support Occupations, Incl. Clerical 28. Protective Service Occupations
29. Food Service Occupations 30. Health Service Occupations
31. Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 32. Personal Service Occupations
33. Mechanics and Repairers 34. Construction Trades
35. Other Precision Production Occupations 36. Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision
37. Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 38. Motor Vehicle Operators
39. Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 40. Construction Laborer
41. Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 42. Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers
44. Farm Workers and Related Occupations 45. Forestry and Fishing Occupations
Source: NLSY79, 1979-2000.
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Figure 1.3: Example: accountants and earth drillers employment distribution across
industries
Accountants
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1. Public Administration 2. Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers
3. Management Related Occupations 4. Engineers
5. Mathematical and Computer Scientists 6. Natural Scientists
7. Health Diagnosing Occupations 8. Health Assessment and Treating Occupations
9. Teachers, College and University 10. Teachers, Except College and University
11. Lawyers and Judges 12. Other Professional Specialty Occupations
13. Health Technologists and Technicians 14. Engineering and Science Technicians
15. Technicians, Exc. Health, Engineering, and Science 16. Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations
17. Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 18. Sales Representatives, Commodities, Exc Retail
19. Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 20. Sales Related Occupations
21. Supervisors - Administrative Support 22. Computer Equipment Operators
23. Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 24. Financial Records, Processing Occupations
25. Mail and Message Distributing 26. Other Adm. Support Occupations, Incl. Clerical
27. Private Household Service Occupations 28. Protective Service Occupations
29. Food Service Occupations 30. Health Service Occupations
31. Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 32. Personal Service Occupations
33. Mechanics and Repairers 34. Construction Trades
35. Other Precision Production Occupations 36. Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision
37. Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 38. Motor Vehicle Operators
39. Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 40. Construction Laborer
41. Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 42. Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers
43. Farm Operators and Managers 44. Farm Workers and Related Occupations
45. Forestry and Fishing Occupations
Source: 1990 Census & QCEW 1979-2000.
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Figure 1.5: Occupational employment risk measure.
*OER for occupations 27 and 28 are 0.30 and 1.35, respectively. I have truncated them at 0.35 in figure 5 for better visualization.
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Median
1. Public Administration 2. Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers
3. Management Related Occupations 4. Engineers
5. Mathematical and Computer Scientists 6. Natural Scientists
7. Health Diagnosing Occupations 8. Health Assessment and Treating Occupations
9. Teachers, College and University 10. Teachers, Except College and University
11. Lawyers and Judges 12. Other Professional Specialty Occupations
13. Health Technologists and Technicians 14. Engineering and Science Technicians
15. Technicians, Exc. Health, Engineering, and Science 16. Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations
17. Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 18. Sales Representatives, Commodities, Exc Retail
19. Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 20. Sales Related Occupations
21. Supervisors - Administrative Support 22. Computer Equipment Operators
23. Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 24. Financial Records, Processing Occupations
25. Mail and Message Distributing 26. Other Adm. Support Occupations, Incl. Clerical
27. Private Household Service Occupations 28. Protective Service Occupations
29. Food Service Occupations 30. Health Service Occupations
31. Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 32. Personal Service Occupations
33. Mechanics and Repairers 34. Construction Trades
35. Other Precision Production Occupations 36. Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision
37. Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 38. Motor Vehicle Operators
39. Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 40. Construction Laborer
41. Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 42. Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers
43. Farm Operators and Managers 44. Farm Workers and Related Occupations
45. Forestry and Fishing Occupations
Source: 1990 Census & QCEW 1979-2000.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Part I
A.1 Weekly Labor Status
The NLSY79 Work History Data provides week-by-week records of the re-
spondents labor force status from January 1, 1978, through the current survey
date. At each year’s survey, information is collected on jobs held and periods not
working since the date of the last interview.1 Since the questions in the NLSY
survey are constructed to collect a complete history for each respondent, regardless
of period of non-interview, it is possible to construct for each respondent, a contin-
uous, week-by-week labor force status record.2 In particular, the respondents labor
force history is constructed by filling in the weeks between the reported beginning
and end dates for different activities (or “inactivities”) with the appropriate labor
status code.
One of the reported issues with the weekly labor status series is the presence
of “split gaps” during employment gaps. “Split gaps” occur during an employment
gap in which individuals report being unemployed for part of the gap and out of
the labor force for the other part of it.3 Since “split gaps” are coded such that
1A job held any day of a week is counted as a job for the whole week.
2For example, a respondent last interviewed in 1987, and not interviewed again until 1990, will
have a complete labor force history, as information for the intervening period will be recovered
in the 1990 interview. The NLSY “Work Experience” section reports that although there may
be potential inconsistencies generated by this method, it does not compromise the quality and/or
completeness of the work history record. For details, see Appendix 18 of the Documentation Files.
3Although the start and stop dates for the whole gap will be those actually reported by the
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the unemployment spell falls between two out-of-labor force spells, they are not
considered to be completed unemployment spells and are therefore, not included
my the sample.


































0, cannot account for week due to invalid starting and end dates;
2, cannot determine whether unemployed or out-of-the labor force;
3, employed but cannot account for all of the time with employer;
4, unemployed;
5, out of the labor force;
7, active military service;
> 7, employed.
About 1% of the weeks in the male, not military sample, have wk equal to 0.
When employed, the assigned code is the actual survey number multiplied by 100
plus the job number for that employer in that year. Based on this classification, I











employed if wk = 3 or wk>7;
unemployed if wk = 4 or (wkt=2)&(2 ≤wkt−1 ≤4) or (wkt=2)&(wkt−1 >7);
other if empstat 6= 1 or 2;
respondent, the assignment of the unemployed and out-of-labor-force states will not represent
actual dates reported by the respondent. Instead, they represent only the number of weeks that
a respondent reported having held each status, with the unemployed status being arbitrarily
assigned to the middle portion of the gap. For further details in “split gaps,” see Appendix 18 in
the NLSY documentation.
4It is worth noting that I do not include individuals who ever work in the military.
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A.2 Industry and Occupational Codes
The Census defines an industry as a group of establishments that produce
similar products or provide similar services. Although many industries are closely
related, each one of them has a unique combination of inputs and outputs, produc-
tion techniques, occupations, and business characteristics. Occupations are classi-
fied based upon work performed, skills, education, training, and credentials. The
classification system covers all occupations in which work is performed for pay or
profit, and is intended to classify workers at the most detailed level possible.
The universe used by the Census for occupation and industry variables are
individuals age sixteen or older who worked within the previous five years and are
not considered new workers.5 Occupation and industry codes report the person’s
primary occupation and industry, which are considered to be the ones in which
the person earns the most money; however, if the respondent was not sure about
their income, his/her primary occupation and industry was then the ones at which
s/he spent the most time. If a person listed more than one occupation and/or
industry, the samples use the first one listed. The occupational codes were assigned
based in the questions: (1) what kind of work was this person doing? and (2) what
were this person’s most important activities or duties? While the industry codes
were assigned based in the following three questions: (1) for whom did this person
work? (name of company, business, organization, or other employer), (2) what kind
of business or industry was this? and (3) is it mainly manufacturing or, wholesale
5“New workers” are defined as persons seeking employment for the first time who have not yet
secured their first job.
38
trade, or retail trade or other?
Matching Industry Codes
In order to estimate the OER measure, I calculate the concentration of occu-
pational employment across industries and the volatility and comovement of disag-
gregated industry employment. Given the fact that there is no single data set with
occupational employment by industry during the period of analysis, 1979-2000, I
combine data from two different sources to compute both components of the OER
measure.
I use data from the 1990 Census to calculate the concentration component of
the OER measure, which is obtained by calculating the shares of occupational em-
ployment in each industry. The volatility component was estimated using data from
the Quartely Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), 1978-2000. However,
these two data sources use different industry classification systems. The Census
uses the Census Industrial Classification (which I will call CIC), while the QCEW
uses the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC). So in order to estimate
OER from these two data sets, I need to match the industry codes across the in-
dustry classification systems. In addition, both classification systems experience
changes over time. Therefore, it is necessary to match industry codes across classi-
fication systems and over time in order to have consistent industry codes over the
period of analysis. An extensive discussion of all criteria applied in this matching
is given by Tristao (2005). I choose the 1980 Census Industry and Occupational
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codes as the base codes for this study. I discuss the occupational codes’ matching
in the next subsection of this appendix.
Over time changes within classification systems can be mainly classified into
three categories: (1) change in the code value assigned for a given industry; (2)
merges and splits in existing industry codes, resulting in the creation of a new
code or disappearance of an existent one; and (3) new industry codes due to a
new industry in the economy. The changes between the Census 1980 and 1990
Industry Classification Systems were minimal and the criteria I use to deal with
them can be summarized by using the correspondent 1980 code for changes of type
(1), combining industry codes into a single code for changes of type (2) and adding
new codes to the closest miscellaneous category with a correspondence in 1980 codes
for the type (3).
The QCEW data uses the 1972 SIC codes for the years 1975-1987 and the 1987
SIC codes for the period 1988-2000. The match within the SIC system was made
through the correspondences offered by the 1987 standard industrial classification
manual, which provides a 4-digit code crosswalk between the 1972 SIC and 1977
SIC and between the 1977 SIC to 1987 SIC. Based in this crosswalk, I merge 3-digit
industry codes if one or more of their 4-digit industries are reported to be combined.
I choose the 1987 SIC codes as the base code for this particular match.
In order to merge the Census industry codes and the Standard Industry Clas-
sification codes, I use a Census crosswalk between 1990 Census Industry codes and
the 1987 SIC codes. The match between these two systems required further 3-digit
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industry code merges to maintain group comparability across classification systems
and time.6 After the matches, I obtain 158 industry codes, which constitutes a
33% reduction from the number of 3-digit industries in 1980 and 1990 CIC codes.
Figure A illustrates the match.
Matching Occupation Codes
The OER measure is calculated for every CPS detailed occupational code
based on the 1980 Census occupational codes. However, the data for calculating the
shares of occupational employment across industries come from the 1990 Census
PUMS, which uses the 1990 Census occupational codes. Therefore, in order to
have consistent occupational codes, I match the codes between both classification
systems. The changes between them were minimal and can be classified into two
types: (1) a change in the code value assigned for a given occupation; and (2)
merges and splits in existent industry codes, resulting in the creation of a new
code or disappearance of an existing one. The procedure I apply in matching the
codes is to use the corresponding 1980 code for changes of type (1), and to combine
occupational codes into a single code for changes of type (2).
The data set I use to assess the relevance of the OER measure for unem-
ployment duration and wages is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79). The NLSY79 uses the 1970 Census occupational codes in reporting the
occupations for up to five jobs each individual held during any survey round.7 Since
6See Census technical paper #65.
7For the main job or CPS job only, it also provides the 1980 Census occupational codes.
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the OER measure is calculated for 1980 Census occupational codes, I match the
1970 Census occupational code to the 1980 Census codes. It is worth noting that
there are significant changes between these two classification systems. The Bureau
of Census technical paper 59 provides, for each occupation, a quantification of the
employment relationship between these two systems, which I use in generating the
correspondences between them. The criterion I use is to assign, for each 1970 oc-
cupational code, the 1980 occupational code that received the largest share of the
1970 occupational code’s employment. Over 76% of all occupations in the 1970
code had over 75% of its employment going to a single occupation code in 1980.8
A.3 Construction of Age-Adjusted Ability Measure
The measures of ability used in this paper are calculated from the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which is a set of ten tests that
measure knowledge and skill in the following areas: (1) general science; (2) arith-
metic reasoning; (3) word knowledge; (4) paragraph comprehension; (5) numerical
operations; (6) coding speed; (7) auto and shop information; (8) mathematic knowl-
edge; (9) mechanical comprehension; and (10) electronics information.
Since the NLSY79 respondents had different ages and educational levels when
they took the tests, and the scores on these “ability” tests may increase with age
and education, it was necessary to adjust the ASVAB test scores for both factors. I
8Around 40% of all occupations in the 1970 code had over 99% of its employment going to
a single occupation code in 1980, while 86% had over 50% of its employment going to a single
occupation code in 1980. Only 3.4% of all occupations in the 1970 code had the highest percentage
of their employment assigned to a 1980 code as less than 50%.
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Table A.1: ASVAB Principal Components.
Component Eigenvalue Diff. Proportion Cumulative
1 6.74144 5.81295 0.6741 0.6741
2 0.9285 0.37823 0.0928 0.767
3 0.55027 0.10989 0.055 0.822
4 0.44038 0.13468 0.044 0.8661
5 0.30571 0.03699 0.0306 0.8966
6 0.26871 0.04837 0.0269 0.9235
7 0.22034 0.0115 0.022 0.9455
8 0.20884 0.02749 0.0209 0.9664
9 0.18134 0.02687 0.0181 0.9846
10 0.15448 . 0.0154 1
Eigenvectors, 1st and 2nd PC 1st PC 2nd PC
General science residuals 0.34016 -0.17568
Arithmetic reasoning residuals 0.33150 0.13789
Word knowledge residuals 0.34340 -0.07447
Paragraph comprehension residuals 0.32602 0.02441
Numerical operations residuals 0.28267 0.52215
Coding speed residuals 0.27085 0.49544
Auto and shop knowledge residuals 0.29872 -0.43598
Mathematics knowledge residuals 0.31038 0.23927
Mechanical comprehension residuals 0.32052 -0.28386
Electrical Information residuals 0.32958 -0.31302
follow the two-step methodology presented by Cawley et al. (1995) and Kermit et al.
(1997), which uses principal components analysis in order to measure age-adjusted
ASVAB scores.
The ASVAB scores are adjusted for age by regressing each test score on age
dummy variables and an indicator variable of whether the respondent had com-
pleted high school when the tests were administered (Kermit et al. (1995)). Prin-
cipal components analysis is performed on the ordinary least square residuals from
these regressions. See Heckman (1995) on using the first two principal components
and Kermit et al. (1997) for an application of this procedure. The estimates are
presented in table A.1.
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Does Experience Make Better Doctors? Evidence from Lasik and Other
Refractive Eye Surgeries
(Coauthored with Juan M. Contreras and Beomsoo Kim)
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2.1 Introduction
It is a common belief that experience can improve the level of skills. In
general, as workers accumulate years of experience, they get better at their jobs.
Athletes and musicians, to mention perhaps the most stylized cases, practice over
and over again until they master the techniques. This common perception suggests
that there may be some learning by doing with practice.
In the last decade a heated debate has arisen among policymakers, consumers’
organizations, health insurance plans and health professionals on whether or not to
regionalize medical care. This debate was fueled by the findings of recent studies
showing strong evidence that high-volume hospitals and high-volume physicians
have lower post-operative mortality than hospitals and physicians with a lower
number of cases.1
One plausible explanation for this high-volume better-outcome relationship is
that there is learning by doing in the provision of medical care. If indeed practice
makes perfect in medicine, then policymakers can improve health outcomes of med-
ical procedures by concentrating resources on few a high-volume hospitals rather
than many smaller hospitals. The idea is that by assigning resources to few hospi-
tals, their physicians will have a high volume of procedures, master the procedures
with practice, and obtain better results.
The alternative hypothesis to learning by doing is selective referral. In this
1Hewitt (2000), Birkmeyer et al. (2002), Ho (2002), Epstein (2003), Birkmeyer et al. (2003),
Sarrazin and Rosenthal (2004) and Ho (2004). For a review of the literature on volume-outcome
see Halm et al. (2002).
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case, patients needing certain high-risk procedures or with high-risk conditions look
for physicians that have a reputation for obtaining good outcomes, which does not
necessarily depend on the amount of experience they have. For instance, variation
in outcomes may be due to the physician’s ability. High-ability doctors may have
better outcomes, regardless of how much experience they have. Their outcomes
will build their reputation, attracting more patients.
Economists have attempted to empirically determine the existence of learning
by doing; especially in production processes.2 In medicine, this task is particularly
complicated due to the fact that medical outcomes are hard to define and measure,
and are generally affected by patient selection and underlying conditions, that make
it difficult to disentangle learning by doing from other effects.
Patient selection and the presence in some patients of underlying conditions
like diabetes and high blood pressure can seriously cloud the analysis of learning
by doing. Patients in more severe states (with higher probability of an adverse out-
come) may look for more experienced physicians.3 So, more experienced surgeons
may in fact face higher adverse outcome rates, not because their experience did not
improve the outcome, but because they treat more severe cases on average. The
opposite bias could also exist if more experienced doctors charge higher prices and
rich people have better underlying conditions. Therefore, in examining the physi-
cian experience-outcome relation, it is very important both to address the patient
selection problem and to take into account patients’ underlying conditions.
2See Alchian (1963), Argote et al. (1990), Gruber (1992), Gruber (1994) and Benkard (2000).
3Patients in more severe conditions may value more physician’s experience than other patients,
given that sicker patients have higher expected returns from having better care.
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Previous studies have used sophisticated types of surgery and post-operative
mortality to analyze the volume-outcome relationship.4 The reason for using surgery
is that it requires a lot of practice. A surgeon needs sophisticated skills to perform
surgery and people believe that those skills can be highly affected by their level of
experience. Post-operative mortality is used as an indicator of a bad outcome due
to the difficulty of precisely measuring (and even observing in the data) the success
of a surgery.5
The caveats of the approach taken by previous studies in examining the
volume-outcome relationship are that: (1) they all use medical procedures in which
the outcome is highly affected by patient observed and unobserved underlying con-
ditions, (2) they cannot identify the effect of physician’s experience on the outcome
from the effect of the medical team that assisted the procedure and (3) they have a
very restricted measure of outcome, which does not capture a whole range of possi-
ble outcomes, like obtaining the best surgery outcome or obtaining a poor surgery
outcome leading to morbidity or future death outside the observed post-operative
period. Furthermore, past studies have observed only physicians’ yearly current
volume of procedures rather than their experience, so they cannot estimate a true
learning curve.
In this paper, we use a type of surgery which has a clear measure of outcome
4The most common used surgeries are coronary angioplasty, coronary artery bypass, myocar-
dial infarction, carotid endarterectomy, pediatric cardiac surgery, surgery for ruptured and unrup-
tured abdominal aortic aneurysm, total hip replacement and cancer surgeries (pancreatic, breast,
colorectal, lung and gastric).
5In most studies, post-operative mortality is usually defined to be death within 30 days of the
surgery.
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and for which the outcome is not as much affected by patient’s underlying conditions
as other medical procedures, once patients are eligible for the surgery. Also the
procedure is performed by only one doctor so there is no need to worry about the
effect of the quality or experience of a medical team on the outcome. In addition,
we use an exceptional data set, in which patient selection is highly minimized, and
that allows us to observe a time series of each physician’s procedures and their
outcomes over time, so we can see if there is a true learning curve.
The procedures in question are different types of refractive eye surgery and,
in particular, Lasik surgery. Refractive surgeries are surgical procedures to correct
nearsightedness, farsightedness and astigmatism. In these procedures, the surgeon
uses a special laser to reshape the cornea changing its focusing power. LASIK
(Laser-Assisted In Situ Keratomileusisis) is a special kind of refractive surgery in
which the surgeon creates a thin flap on the cornea with a special tool. The flap
is folded back, and a laser is used to remove certain amount of corneal tissue. The
surgeon then places the flap back down again (see figure B.1).6
Refractive laser surgery is voluntary and there are few eligibility criteria to be
met to undergo the procedures.7 For patients who are eligible for surgery, outcomes
should depend mostly on two inputs: labor (skill of the ophthalmologist) and capital
(the machine used for surgery). The few patients’ underlying conditions that could
6In comparison with other refractive surgery procedures, Lasik became a very popular due to
the fast vision recovery and to the minimal pain.
7The presence of a subclinical keratoconus, a corneal warpage syndrome, irregular astigma-
tism or thin cornea are generally contraindications to having refractive surgery. Also Lasik is
not recommended for patients with autoimmune diseases (e.g., lupus, rheumatoid arthritis) and
immunodeficiency states (e.g., HIV). Some doctors also do not operate on patients younger than
18 years old or with diabetes. For details see Pallikaris and Siganos (1997) and FDA guidelines
on Laser surgeries.
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potentially affect outcome, like age and pre-surgery eyesight, can be easily observed
and controlled for.8
We have full access to the individual medical charts of the population of pa-
tients that underwent refractive surgery in one of the major ophthalmologic clinics
and surgical centers in Medellin, Colombia. This clinic has 30 doctors, 29 of whom
perform refractive surgery. This surgical center opened in July 2003 with a brand
new Schwind Esiris laser machine and currently has the biggest market share in
Medellin.9 We have two years of data with a total of 3, 314 refractive surgery cases
(eyes). We collected information not only on pre-surgery eyesight measures and
surgical plans, but also on all post-surgery follow-ups during the subsequent two-
year period. In addition, we observe basic demographic characteristics for patients,
such as gender, age, marital status, date and place of birth, occupation, neighbor-
hood and city of residence. The key feature of this data, however, is that we can
observe the time series of procedures performed by each physician, which allows us
to test for the existence of learning by doing in this medical procedure. If indeed
practice makes perfect, then we should observe a learning curve, that is, we should
observe an improvement in physicians’ outcomes as they accumulate experience.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 describes the data, the
measures of outcome and the empirical methodology we implemented. Section 2.3
8For example, in comparison with Lasik surgery, the outcome of coronary surgeries can be
affected by age, gender, body surface area, operative priority, cardiac function as measured by
left ventricular ejection fraction, previous myocardial infarction, the presence of left main stem
coronary artery disease, previous cardiac surgery, peripheral vascular disease, diabetes, renal
function, hypertension, angina, dyspnoea (breathlessness) and smoking.
9Their market share is estimated to be around 57% of all refractive surgery procedures done
in Medellin. There are only three other surgical centers in the city, two of which use a much older
laser technology.
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presents and discusses our findings, and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
2.2.1 Data
The data used in this study is the population of patients that underwent
refractive surgery in one of the major ophthalmologic clinics and surgical centers
in Medellin, Colombia. We collected the data directly from the individual patient
charts of CLOFAN (Clinica Oftalmologica de Antioquia).
CLOFAN owns a surgical center in which a whole range of eye surgeries are
performed, including different types of refractive surgeries. This surgical center
opened in July 2003 with a brand new Schwind Esiris laser machine. This equip-
ment is used not only by the CLOFAN doctors but also by doctors from other
clinics that rent the equipment and facilities for their own surgeries. Twenty-nine
out of thirty CLOFAN doctors perform refractive surgeries in this surgical center.10
Before July 2003, some doctors of CLOFAN performed refractive surgery in
two other surgical centers in Medellin using older laser technology. However, despite
the fact that some of the physicians did not perform their first laser eye surgery
in CLOFAN, the outcomes of refractive surgery are known to be particular to
the combination of surgeon, laser machine and environment (Pallikaris and Siganos
10Although in theory, CLOFAN doctors could use other surgical centers’ machines’, they have
high incentives not to do so since CLOFAN’s equipment is the best available technology in the city,
and using other surgical centers’ machines, would require them to pay rent. Moreover, CLOFAN
doctors as a group need to perform a certain number of surgeries a month to make their equipment
pay-off its cost and generate some profit.
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(1997)). Every machine uses its own specific inner algorithm to convert the surgical
plan into laser beam cuts, which also depend on environmental conditions such as
temperature and humidity in the surgical room; the surgeon has to weight all these
circumstances when performing the surgery and has to adapt every time these
conditions change. In particular, the amount and shape of laser energy necessary
to obtain the desired correction is based on a “nomogram” which each surgeon or
surgical center develops for the surgeries based on the typical response of patients
treated.11
We have two years of data (from July 2003 until August 2005) with a total of
3, 892 surgery cases (each case is an eye) and 2, 042 patients. All surgeries in our
data were done by one of the twenty-nine CLOFAN doctors who performs refrac-
tive surgery. From the patients’ charts we collected pre-surgery eyesight measures,
surgical plans, and all post-surgery follow-up evaluations. We also recorded basic
patient demographic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, date and
place of birth, occupation, neighborhood and city of residence. Moreover, limited
information on patient and family medical history and patient’s health insurance
coverage is also available to us.12 In addition, the patient chart also includes a
report on basic information on the surgery: time of surgery (to the precision of
seconds), type of procedure, specific technique, blade and ring used, temperature
11In the case of CLOFAN, all doctors use the same nomogram developed and periodically
updated by the surgical center based on a sample of treated patients. Section 2.3.3 discusses in
more detail the potential effects of the nomogram and its updates on surgeries’ outcome.
12Most of the reported medical history data were related to eyesight problems. Although
99.6% of patients reported having some type of health insurance coverage, refractive surgery is
not covered by health plans. Once patients have paid for the surgery, any additional costs of
re-treatment are covered by the clinic.
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and humidity in the room, software version, diameter of the cornea, and whether
or not there was any complication during the surgery.
We collected data on all refractive surgeries performed by the CLOFAN doc-
tors, most of which consist of three procedures: LASIK, ORK and MULTIZONE.
All these procedures are used to correct nearsightedness, farsightedness and astig-
matism and they vary on the type of flap the surgeon cuts in the cornea and the
technique he/she applies for the laser beam cuts. Table 2.1 provides some basic
statistics. Although we have data from July 2003 until August 2005, which give us
3, 892 surgery cases (eyes) and 2, 042 patients, we only use data until January 2005,
in order to have a six-month window for post-surgery follow-ups’ evaluations.
Table 2.1: Basic statistics (July-2003 to January-2005)
Number of doctors performing refractive surgery 29




Number of patients 1,480
Patient average age 38.89
(13.35)*
% Male patients 0.35
* Standard deviation.
In our data, we cannot verify selective referral since we do not observe if the
patient was referred to a particular doctor by a friend or if he/she was assigned by
the front desk. We know, however, that a large number of patients are assigned
to particular doctors by the front desk, which distributes patients based on an
arbitrary rule that does not depend directly on doctors’ experience or outcomes,
but rather on the past month’s earnings. Since CLOFAN doctors are shareholders
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of the clinic and surgical center, the clinic tries to equalize their earnings through
the assignment of patients that come to the clinic without a referral.13 In this sense,
although the assignment of doctors to patients is not completely random, the fact
that the clinic bases its assignment rule not on experience but on past earnings
should reduce bias due to selective referral. And if differences in doctor ability are
driving the assignment of patients not assigned by the front desk, we can control
for ability by incorporating doctor fixed effects into our analysis.
The key feature of this data is that we can observe the order of all refractive
surgeries performed by each physician over time using this new technology. Thus
the nature of this data allows us to test for the existence of learning by doing in
this medical procedure. If indeed practice makes perfect, then we should observe
a learning curve; that is, we should observe an improvement in the physicians’
outcomes as they accumulate experience.
2.2.2 Measures of Eyesight and Outcomes
This section describes eyesight measures generated by ophthalmologist ex-
aminations. Initially, the patient is asked to read several letters of different sizes.
This visual acuity exam provides the Snellen measure on a scale between 20/10 to
20/800, depending on the letter sizes the patient is able to read. In some cases, the
patient cannot read any letters and the value is called “finger counting”.
This first examination is informative, but in order to determine refractive
13Notice that this will not affect the cross-section variation in experience for surgeons within a
cohort since refractive surgeries are only some of the procedures performed by CLOFAN doctors.
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error and prescribe a corrective lens, the ophthalmologist needs to perform a re-
fraction assessment.14 A lens prescription consists of three measures – the sphere,
the cylinder and the axis – and is expressed as sphere = cylinder ∗ axis = 20/xx,
where units are called “dioptries”. The first number is the correction in the sphere
of the eye and determines the degree of myopia or near-sightedness (if negative)
or the degree of hyperopia or far-sightedness (if positive). The second and third
numbers are, respectively, the correction on the cylinder and on the axis, which
determine the degree of astigmatism. The last two numbers, “20/xx”, determines
the visual acuity the correction given by the three first numbers xxx = xxx ∗ xxx
can provide. In other words, it expresses the best possible visual acuity that the
patient can get. A value of zero for the first number or second number in the ex-
pression above means a perfect sphere or a perfect cylinder, which implies that the
patient does not have myopia/hyperopia or astigmatism.
In order to measure the cornea and get values for the sphere, the cylinder and
the axis, the doctor has several options; one is to measure the cornea directly with
an automated refractometry; an other possibility is to try several combinations of
lenses to correct the vision, which is called a subjective examination. The subjective
evaluation is a doctor’s evaluation of the correction required from the optical lenses
to produce eyesight in the Snellen measure scale. These exams can be conducted
with the eye muscles relaxed using eyedrops (“dilated” measures) or without the
use of drops. The choice of the measurement method depends on the doctor’s
preferences.
14Refraction refers to how light waves are bent as they pass through your cornea and lens.
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After the cornea measurement, the doctor makes a plan for the surgery which
determines the correction to be performed for each defect. After the surgery, the
doctor performs several follow-up examinations where he measures eyesight either
with the Snellen scale, refractometry or with subjective evaluation.
Table 2.2: Crosswalk across different eye sight measures
Snellen Measure Spherical Equivalent
Myopia Hyperopia








20/125 -2 9 2.75
20/100 -1.75 8 2.5
20/80 -1.5 7 2.25
20/70 -1.25 6.25 2
20/60 -1.25 6.25 2
20/50 -1 5.25 1.75
20/40 -0.75 4.625 1.5
20/30 -0.5 3.625 1
20/25 -0.25 2.5 0.5




In order to have a single outcome measure we need to overcome two difficulties
with the data. The first is that we need to combine the refraction data into a
single measure that captures not only myopia/hyperopia but also astigmatism.
This measure is called the Spherical Equivalent (SE) and it is a standard metric
used by ophthalmologists. The Spherical Equivalent is obtained by dividing the
degree of astigmatism (or the cylinder deviation) by 2 and adding this number
to the degree of myopia (hyperopia). For example, if the subjective evaluation is
(-2.5) = (-3.5) x 180 (which means a myopia of -2.5 dioptries and an astigmatism
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of -3.5 dioptries, measured in the 180 degrees axis), the spherical equivalent would
be equal to (-3.5/2) + (-2.5) = -4.25. For a perfect eye, the spherical equivalent
should be zero but any measure between -0.5 and 0.5 dioptries is considered a good
eyesight.
The second problem comes from the fact that not all doctors take all measures
before and after surgery. Some doctors prefer to report only the Snellen measure,
while others report also or only the refraction measures. Fortunately, it is possible
to construct a crosswalk across different eye sight measures using equivalences well
known to ophthalmologists. The crosswalk is presented in table 2.2.15
2.2.3 Econometric Model
The main question of this paper is whether we observe learning by doing in
refractive eye surgery and, in particular, Lasik surgery. We define learning by doing
to be the improvement in surgery outcomes due to the accumulated experience of
the physician in performing a specific medical procedure. Our empirical strategy
aims to identify this effect. However, in doing so, we need to consider that there
may be other types of learning that could affect surgeries’ outcome. For instance,
as time passes, doctors may have some general learning of the procedure coming
from sources like specialized magazines, professional congresses or other types of
surgeries. Also, there may be some learning in the clinic and in the surgical center
which are passed on to the doctors and affect outcomes through updates in the
15We constructed this crosswalk under the supervision of an optometrist using the following ref-
erences Weatherly (2002), Gillet and Goldblum (2004) and Commission for Safety, Rehabilitation
and Compensation of Commonwealth Employees 2006 Report on the visual system.
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nomogram they all use in their surgeries.
Even if our data set contains a very good measure of physician experience
in performing refractive surgery, it is hard to disentangle the effect of learning by
doing from the general learning that comes with time. This happens because both
effects are highly collinear since experience accumulates with time. With respect
to the learning coming from the nomogram, we can effectively identify it since we
know all the dates the nomogram was updated.
One of the nice features of the data is that it contains different measures of
outcomes. In our analysis, we use five of these measures. The first is the absolute
value of the post-surgical Spherical Equivalent taken in the last follow-up (in a six
month window) observed at least 2 weeks after the surgery. We take the absolute
value because it is the deviation from zero that matters, while the sign indicates
only the kind of eye problem (myopia or hyperopia). The second measure we use is
a dummy for success or failure of the procedure. A Spherical Equivalent between
-0.5 and 0.5 dioptries is considered a good outcome and a success. Values outside
this window are considered a failure. The third measure is an indicator of whether
the patient needed at least one re-treatment (new surgery).16 The fourth measure
is the number of required follow ups visits after the surgery. And finally, the
fifth outcome measure is the absolute value of the achieved minus the attempted
correction, a measure that ophthalmologists consider important since it indicates
the how good was their correction with respect to the surgical plan. It is worth
noting that the attempted outcome is not always a spherical equivalent of zero. For
16It is worth noting that not all surgeries that failed (outside ±0.5D) required a re-treatment.
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instance, based on the patient’s lifestyle (occupation, recreational activities, etc),
age, eyeglass prescription and accommodation of the eye muscles, the physician
may consider that a full correction is not attainable or advisable. Moreover, the
physician may decide to specialize one eye for nearsightedness and the other eye for
farsightedness. The fifth measure of outcome is only used in the initial exploration of
the data, since using this measure as a dependent variable would imply introducing
a decision variable into the left hand side of the regression, imposing a coefficient
of one on this covariate.
So in order to test for learning by doing effects, we estimate the following
equations:
Outcomeijk = Xjβ + Y δ + µijk (2.1)
where Outcomeijk is the outcome for the surgery on the i
th eye (i = [left, right])
of patient j operated on by doctor k. A perfect outcome has a value of zero; de-
viations are due to the existence of post-operative myopia/hyperopia and/or astig-
matism. We only consider first surgeries in our sample, although we accumulate
all surgeries (1st surgeries and re-treatments) when calculating doctor’s experi-
ence. Xj = [Age, Sex, Presurgery eyesight] is a vector of patient characteristics.
Y = [nk, nomogram updates
′ dummies, time trend] is a vector of learning ef-
fects, where nk is the number of surgeries performed by doctor k before surgery
ij;17 this is the variable of interest, since its coefficient measures the slope of the
learning curve. If the hypothesis of learning by doing is true, doctors should get
17The initial nomogram (starting July 2003) was updated on December 2003 and May 2004.
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better outcomes (i.e. measures of spherical equivalent closer to zero) in the nth
surgery than in the nth −1 surgery, so that we should expect a negative sign on the
coefficients in δ.
Other important identifying issue is that the learning curve may be flat in
some portions or the learning speed may be different at certain range of surgeries.
We try to examine the importance of these non-linearities by introducing a spline
in the previous regression and by estimating a piecewise linear regression in addi-
tion to equation (2.1).18 The spline we use have knots at surgeries number 50, 100
and 160; these knots were chosen based on the breaks we observe in most of next
section figures. In the piecewise linear regression, we rewrite the Y vector to be
Y = [Y ∗, time trend], where:
Y ∗ = α1(I = S1) + α2(I = S2) + α3(I = S3) + θ1nS1k(I = S1) + θ2nS2k(I =
S2) + θ3nS3k(I = S3)
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Initial Exploration of the Data
We start with a description of outcomes, using the outcome measure that is
most commonly used in previous medical analysis, which compares the achieved
correction with the attempted correction. Figure 2.1 shows graphs for Lasik surg-
eries and for all refractive surgeries. A perfect outcome lies on the 45 degree line
18A spline allows different slopes at different range of observations.
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where the achieved correction equals the attempted correction, i.e. the surgery plan
defined by the doctor is successfully implemented.
Outcomes that lie below the 45 degree line are undercorrections, while out-
comes that lie above the 45 degree line are overcorrections, such as when the patient
had myopia before the surgery and end ups with some degree of hyperopia after
it. We can observe from figure 2.1 that there is a larger dispersion in the degree of
hyperopia corrections than on the myopia ones which suggest that doctors obtain
better results in myopia than in hyperopia surgeries.
We turn next to investigate the main question of the paper, which is if we
observe a learning curve in the data. A learning curve would imply that the out-
comes improve with the number of surgeries. For all our measures of outcome, a
learning curve would show a negative slope in the plot of the number of previous
surgeries vs. outcomes.
Figures 2.2 through 2.9 show simple graphs that suggest learning by doing
for the Lasik procedures and for all refractive procedures in the case of outcome
number 1 (final spherical equivalent obtained after the surgery), outcome number 2
(percentage of final spherical equivalents outside the window [−0.5, 0.5] dioptries),
outcome number 3 (whether the patient needed at least one re-treatment), outcome
number 4 (the number of required follow ups visits after the surgery) and outcome
number 5 (absolute value of the attempted minus the achieved correction). The
graphs plot average outcome across doctors by number of surgeries.
None of the graphs exhibits a positive slope and most show a mild downward
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Figure 2.1: Achieved vs. Attempted Correction in the Eyesight.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.8: Indicator of whether the patients need at least one retreament, All
refractive surgeries (left) and Lasik Surgeries (right).
























































































































Figure 2.9: Number of required follow up visits after the surgery, All refractive

































































































































































































































































































slope. We find the strongest evidence of learning by doing in the cases of: (1)
bad outcomes for Lasik Surgeries, all cases and myopia, (2) the absolute value
of achieved minus attempted correction for all refractive surgeries and all lasik
cases, (3) percentage of patients needing a second Lasik surgery and (4) number of
required follow up visits after Lasik surgery. In part, the lack of striking evidence
in all reported cases and outcomes could be explained by the fact that at this
point we are only looking at the raw data. The are many other factors that may
affect outcomes that we are not controlling for, such compositional effects, doctors’
individual skills or other environmental factors like humidity.
A potentially important confounding factor could be changes in the degree
of severity in patients’ pre-existing conditions over time. If the severity of patient
cases is falling over time, then some of the trends we observe in the graphs may be
due to surgeries becoming easier with time. In order to elucidate this point, figures
2.10 and 2.11 show the initial spherical equivalent of the average patient per group
of surgeries. Fortunately, these figures do not exhibit a clear trend with respect to
doctors’ surgical experience.
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Looking at the regressions in tables 2.3 through 2.6, the first thing to notice
about the control variables is that the patient characteristic like age and pre-surgical
spherical equivalent are very important for the outcome as well as the humidity of
the room. The patient gender is only important in the cases of the post-surgical
spherical equivalent and in the number of visits.
In the simplest case, regression 1, we get a statistically significant negative
effect of the experience on the outcome in all outcome measures except in the
multi-surgery measure, which suggests that the outcome improves with the doc-
tors’ experience. It is important to notice that the squared terms are also statisti-
cally significant. The evidence is much weaker in the case of the time trend alone
(regression 3) since it is statistically significant only in the case of the good/bad
outcome, even if the sign suggests learning in time in all but in the multi-surgery.
The learning effect is much stronger both in terms of the statistically significance
and magnitude of the coefficient in the case of nomogram change (regression 2).
Again, there is no effect on the multi-surgery outcome measure. It is interesting
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that the only significant effect is that of the last nomogram, suggesting an effective
learning in the clinic or surgical center in incorporating the environmental and ma-
chine setting conditions and translating the surgical plan into the desired eyesight
correction. Taken together, these regressions suggest that there is a learning effect
that may come from the experience, from the institutional learning or from the
time learning.
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Table 2.3: Good outcome if inside the window [−0.5. + 0.5] Dioptries
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (7) (6) (8) (10) (9) (11) (12) (13)
age 0.0062 0.0061 0.006 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.006 0.006
(0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0010)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)**
sex 0.053 0.0501 0.0503 0.0523 0.05 0.048 0.0503 0.0485 0.0476 0.0455 0.0464 0.0476 0.0478
(0.0305)+ -0.03 -0.0306 (0.0305)+ -0.0316 -0.0309 -0.0314 -0.0309 -0.0308 -0.0314 -0.0312 -0.0313 -0.0315
abspre 0.0267 0.026 0.0257 0.0263 0.0261 0.0259 0.0263 0.0258 0.0256 0.0254 0.0255 0.0265 0.0264
(0.0062)** (0.0061)** (0.0061)** (0.0061)** (0.0061)** (0.0060)** (0.0060)** (0.0061)** (0.0060)** (0.0059)** (0.0059)** (0.0060)** (0.0061)**
hum 0.007 0.0053 0.0033 0.0056 0.0045 0.0047 0.005 0.0064 0.0054 0.0044 0.0047 0.0054 0.0055
(0.0031)* (0.0029)+ -0.0027 (0.0030)+ -0.0027 -0.0028 (0.0029)+ (0.0027)* (0.0029)+ -0.0026 -0.0028 (0.0025)* (0.0027)+
n -0.0023 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001
(0.0008)** -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013
n
2 8.41e-6 5.71e-6 4.47e-6 5.98e-6
(2.79e-6)** (2.73e-6)* 3.40e-6 (2.86e-6)*
t -0.0163 -0.0112 0.0135 0.0194 -0.0129 0.0279 0.0083
(0.0089)+ -0.013 -0.0286 -0.0307 -0.0123 -0.0357 -0.0296
t
2 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003
-0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.001
s1 -0.1712 -0.1836
-0.1243 -0.1438
s2 -0.036 -0.0498 -0.1033 -0.1043 -0.0595 -0.1277 -0.1788 -0.2211
-0.0387 -0.0518 -0.1065 -0.1082 -0.0529 -0.1216 -0.12 -0.214
s3 -0.1357 -0.1852 -0.268 -0.2713 -0.1872 -0.2952 -0.3135 -0.3741
(0.0406)** (0.0900)* -0.1586 -0.1608 (0.0792)* (0.1682)+ (0.1219)* -0.2851
n∗1 -0.0034 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.0027




0.0017 0.0023 0.0027 0.0024




-0.003 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0024




0.0025 0.0029 0.0029 0.0026
(0.0007)** (0.0009)** (0.0006)** (0.0008)**
s1 ∗ n1j 0.0018 0.0016
-0.0013 -0.0015
s2 ∗ n2j 0.0004 0.0001
-0.0015 -0.0017
s3 ∗ n3j 0.0016 0.0015
-0.0011 -0.0014
Const -0.1371 -0.063 -0.0008 -0.0715 -0.0587 -0.0972 -0.1061 -0.0815 -0.0391 -0.0266 -0.0697 0 0
-0.1453 -0.1469 -0.1296 -0.1479 -0.133 -0.1521 -0.153 -0.1251 -0.1352 -0.1252 -0.1364 0 0
Obs 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598
R2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.1
Standard Errors in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
hum=humidity; abspre=pre-surgical spherical equivalent; n = number of surgeries; sl=nomogram l=1 to 3; n
∗
m = m
th knot of the spline
nlj : number of surgeries performed by surgeon j under nomogram l where n1j + n2j + n2j = nj
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Table 2.4: Outcome measure: Absolute value of final spherical equivalent
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (7) (6) (8) (10) (9) (11) (12) (13)
age 0.0094 0.0092 0.0092 0.0093 0.0093 0.0091 0.0092 0.0097 0.0095 0.0095 0.0094 0.0092 0.0089
(0.0023)** (0.0023)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0023)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0022)**
sex 0.1129 0.1117 0.1094 0.1099 0.1075 0.1109 0.1091 0.1 0.097 0.0949 0.0971 0.1056 0.1081
(0.0565)+ (0.0567)+ (0.0562)+ (0.0559)+ (0.0559)+ (0.0569)+ (0.0563)+ (0.0559)+ (0.0556)+ (0.0552)+ (0.0558)+ (0.0560)+ (0.0556)+
abspre 0.0784 0.0769 0.0771 0.0771 0.0776 0.0769 0.077 0.0755 0.075 0.0752 0.0749 0.077 0.0766
(0.0127)** (0.0126)** (0.0126)** (0.0124)** (0.0126)** (0.0126)** (0.0124)** (0.0128)** (0.0127)** (0.0128)** (0.0128)** (0.0125)** (0.0124)**
hum 0.0171 0.0114 0.0122 0.0121 0.014 0.0111 0.0117 0.0147 0.0112 0.0127 0.0109 0.0134 0.0104
-0.0102 -0.0087 -0.0079 -0.0089 -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0084 (0.0084)+ -0.0079 -0.0076 -0.0075 -0.0079 -0.0076
n -0.0039 0.0016 0.0002 0.0015
(0.0018)* -0.0037 -0.003 -0.0038
n
2 1.30e-5 2.12e-6 4.44e-6 2.54e-6
(6.34e-6)* 9.21e-6 8.01e-6 9.37e-6
t -0.0275 -0.0479 0.0077 -0.0174 -0.0413 0.0079 -0.0254
-0.0243 -0.0398 -0.0586 -0.0715 -0.042 -0.0844 -0.0602
t
2 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005
-0.001 -0.0012 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.0021
s1 -0.3073 -0.2158
-0.3965 -0.386
s2 -0.1295 -0.1678 -0.1428 -0.1138 -0.1569 -0.1834 -0.4978 -0.2728
-0.0938 -0.1086 -0.1892 -0.2017 -0.1092 -0.2298 -0.4086 -0.4553
s3 -0.2609 -0.3609 -0.2486 -0.2213 -0.3167 -0.2899 -0.6327 -0.1893




-0.0095 -0.0028 -0.0051 -0.0038




0.0072 0.009 0.0088 0.009




-0.008 -0.0059 -0.0065 -0.0061




0.0046 0.0061 0.0052 0.006
(0.0012)** (0.0017)** (0.0011)** (0.0016)**
s1 ∗ n1j -0.0005 0.0013
-0.0022 -0.0024
s2 ∗ n2j 0.0018 0.0045
-0.0036 -0.0041
s3 ∗ n3j 0.0017 0.0048
-0.0016 (0.0027)+
Const -0.423 -0.1347 -0.2162 -0.1639 -0.317 -0.1844 -0.2026 -0.1832 -0.0385 -0.1354 -0.093 0 0
-0.4919 -0.4209 -0.3649 -0.4365 -0.439 -0.426 -0.439 -0.4089 -0.3862 -0.3926 -0.3826 0 0
Obs 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
Standard Errors in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
hum=humidity; abspre=pre-surgical spherical equivalent; n = number of surgeries; sl=nomogram l=1 to 3; n
∗
m = m
th knot of the spline
nlj : number of surgeries performed by surgeon j under nomogram l where n1j + n2j + n2j = nj
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Table 2.5: Outcome measure: Number of visits after surgery
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (7) (6) (8) (10) (9) (11) (12) (13)
age 0.0131 0.0129 0.0132 0.013 0.0132 0.0128 0.013 0.0133 0.013 0.0133 0.013 0.0129 0.0125
(0.0034)** (0.0034)** (0.0033)** (0.0035)** (0.0034)** (0.0034)** (0.0034)** (0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0034)** (0.0035)** (0.0034)** (0.0034)**
sex 0.164 0.1648 0.1569 0.1659 0.1608 0.1644 0.1657 0.1655 0.1678 0.1635 0.1676 0.1607 0.1649
(0.0955)+ (0.0954)+ -0.0978 (0.0938)+ -0.0956 (0.0955)+ (0.0939)+ -0.0979 (0.0957)+ -0.0977 (0.0958)+ -0.0975 (0.0968)+
abspre 0.0455 0.0437 0.0443 0.0439 0.0447 0.0437 0.0439 0.0451 0.0441 0.0445 0.044 0.0459 0.0455
(0.0201)* (0.0195)* (0.0199)* (0.0197)* (0.0200)* (0.0195)* (0.0197)* (0.0203)* (0.0199)* (0.0202)* (0.0199)* (0.0193)* (0.0195)*
hum 0.0125 -0.001 0.0066 -0.0007 0.0066 -0.0013 -0.001 0.0107 -0.0007 0.0052 -0.0011 0.0095 0.0019
-0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0078 -0.0097 -0.0089 -0.0096 -0.0097 -0.0093 -0.0097 -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0101 -0.0103
n -0.0065 -0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0006
(0.0033)+ -0.0064 -0.0058 -0.0063
n
2 1.60e-5 6.98e-6 8.73e-6 7.30e-6
(8.75e-6)+ 1.37e-5 1.35e-5 1.34e-5
t -0.0195 -0.0222 0.0082 0.0039 -0.0227 0.0041 -0.046
-0.0324 -0.0752 -0.0879 -0.0995 -0.0738 -0.108 -0.0952
t
2 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0014
-0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0033
s1 2.2653 2.5045
(0.6690)** (0.7109)**
s2 -0.1739 -0.0998 -0.1114 -0.0977 -0.0582 -0.09 2.3231 2.8153
-0.1505 -0.2688 -0.3636 -0.3481 -0.2574 -0.3659 (0.6190)** (0.9055)**
s3 -0.4873 -0.3814 -0.1996 -0.1874 -0.3343 -0.1869 1.9353 2.8806




-0.009 0.0002 -0.0051 -0.0005




-0.0025 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0002




-0.0013 0.0022 0.0009 0.0022




-0.0012 0.002 -0.0004 0.0019
-0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015
s1 ∗ n1j 0.0064 0.0097
-0.0052 (0.0048)+
s2 ∗ n2j -0.003 0.0024
-0.0034 -0.0034
s3 ∗ n3j 0 0.0065
-0.004 -0.0038
Const 2.3776 2.9038 2.5227 2.9052 2.5809 2.8668 2.8731 2.514 2.8946 2.68 2.8731 0 0
(0.6191)** (0.5744)** (0.4242)** (0.5714)** (0.5718)** (0.6182)** (0.6046)** (0.5859)** (0.5804)** (0.5562)** (0.5959)** 0 0
Obs 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Standard Errors in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
hum=humidity; abspre=pre-surgical spherical equivalent; n = number of surgeries; sl=nomogram l=1 to 3; n
∗
m = m
th knot of the spline
nlj : number of surgeries performed by surgeon j under nomogram l where n1j + n2j + n2j = nj
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Table 2.6: Outcome measure: If more than one surgery was needed
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (7) (6) (8) (10) (9) (11) (12) (13)
age 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0005)+ -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 (0.0005)+ -0.0005 -0.0004 (0.0005)+ (0.0005)+ (0.0005)+ -0.0005 (0.0005)+ -0.0005
sex 0.0172 0.0179 0.0177 0.0176 0.0168 0.0178 0.0176 0.0169 0.0176 0.0168 0.0176 0.0175 0.0184
-0.0118 -0.0121 -0.012 -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.0121 -0.0121 -0.012 -0.0122 -0.0121 -0.0122 -0.0119 -0.012
abspre 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
-0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0027
hum 0.0028 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0021 0.0013 0.0014 0.0025 0.0013 0.0018 0.0012 0.0017 0.0012
(0.0009)** -0.0009 (0.0007)* -0.0009 (0.0008)* -0.0009 -0.0009 (0.0008)** -0.0008 (0.0008)* -0.0009 (0.0008)+ -0.0008
n -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002
-0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004
n
2 7.54e-7 4.77e-7 -7.13e-8 6.38e-7
6.57e-7 1.05e-6 8.89e-7 1.01e-6
t 0.0056 0.0018 0.0179 0.0136 0.0046 0.0182 0.0288
-0.0044 -0.006 -0.011 -0.0117 -0.0065 -0.0129 (0.0108)*
t
2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0011
-0.0002 -0.0002 (0.0004)+ -0.0004 -0.0002 (0.0004)+ (0.0004)**
s1 -0.0693 -0.1024
-0.0428 (0.0444)*
s2 0.0087 -0.0103 -0.052 -0.0466 -0.002 -0.0504 -0.0757 -0.2062
-0.0158 -0.0192 -0.0397 -0.0392 -0.02 -0.0393 (0.0372)+ (0.0695)**
s3 -0.0066 -0.0447 -0.0806 -0.0751 -0.0334 -0.084 -0.095 -0.2613




-0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007




0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006




0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002




0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
-0.0002 (0.0002)+ -0.0002 -0.0002
s1 ∗ n1j -0.0006 -0.0013
-0.0004 (0.0005)*
s2 ∗ n2j 0 -0.0004
-0.0006 -0.0007
s3 ∗ n3j 0.0002 0.0003
-0.0002 -0.0003
Const -0.1313 -0.0839 -0.0769 -0.0841 -0.1064 -0.1014 -0.0996 -0.1017 -0.0724 -0.0816 -0.0862 0 0
(0.0447)** (0.0448)+ (0.0341)* (0.0417)+ (0.0376)** (0.0512)+ (0.0479)* (0.0432)* (0.0395)+ (0.0377)* (0.0456)+ 0 0
Obs 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Standard Errors in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
hum=humidity; abspre=pre-surgical spherical equivalent; n = number of surgeries; sl=nomogram l=1 to 3; n
∗
m = m
th knot of the spline
nlj : number of surgeries performed by surgeon j under nomogram l where n1j + n2j + n2j = nj
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In order to further investigate which is the relevant learning effect we regress
different combinations of all three effects. When combined with the nomogram
variable, the experience measure loses all the statistical significance and the nomo-
gram measure is relevant only in the case of the good/bad outcome and in the
final spherical equivalent outcome measure. When combined with the time trend,
the experience measure also loses all the significance and the time trend is only
relevant in the case of good/bad outcome. However, the quadratic term keeps the
significance when using this outcome. If all the learning variables are put together,
none of them has any statistical significance, but only the nomogram variable keeps
always the right sign. As discussed before, it is hard to identify all these effects sep-
arately, but the institutional learning reflected in the nomogram is the hypothesis
that is more supported by the data.
When investigating the existence of nonlinearities, the spline shows an im-
portant effect of the nomogram in the case of the first two outcome measures, and
the overall joint significance of the different slopes in each group of surgeries is not
important with some having opposite signs in some groups. If something, there is
some significance in the slope reflecting learning by doing in the first 50 surgeries in
the case of the good/bad outcome measure. The piecewise linear regression, which
looks to determine the existence of different regimes and learning curves every time
the clinic changes the nomogram, shows a similar story. The effect of the nomogram
is consistently affecting the outcomes and the effect of the experience is weaker.
Summarizing the regressions results, the empirical evidence points towards a
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clinic or surgical center learning instead of learning by doing or learning in time.
This comes from the facts that the strongest statistical evidence of the effect of
learning on the outcomes comes from the changes in the nomogram, while there
is no statistical evidence of an effect of learning in time and only weak statistical
evidence of the effect of experience in Lasik outcomes.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the existence of learning by doing in Lasik and
other types of refractive eye surgeries. We use a remarkable data set that allows us
to observe the evolution of well defined outcomes for a group of doctors since they
began performing laser surgeries in June 2003.
The distinguished feature of this paper, in comparison with previous studies,
is the use of a longitudinal data set with good measures of doctors’ experience
and medical outcomes. Past studies have instead used cross sectional data linking
volume with poorly defined measures of outcomes making it difficult to isolate the
effect of learning by doing from other effects such as selective referral.
Although the main question of the paper is whether physicians’ outcomes
improve with their experience, we also allow for the possibility of learning coming
from a time trend or from the accumulation of experience in the surgical center. We
do find evidence of learning, although, it points towards an institutional learning
reflected in the updates of the clinic nomogram used to translate the surgical plan
into the desired eyesight correction.
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As a future extension of this research, we plan to analyze the medical pro-
cedure in the context of a production technology for which the outcomes are the
products while the technology, the nomogram and the accumulated skills of the
doctors are the input factors.
The empirical evidence provided here is potentially relevant to the policy
debate about regionalized medical care since it investigates and suggests potential




Figure B.1: Steps in Lasik procedure (Source: Allaboutvision.com)
Figure B.2: Final Spherical Equivalent by Doctor, Lasik























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.3: Absolute Value of Achieved-Attempted Correction by Doctor, Lasik
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